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Abstract 
This paper assesses the boundaries of the European Community (EC) rules on free 
movement of persons in light of the doctrine on “purely internal situations” falling 
outside the scope of EC law. Following the settled case law of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), the EC Treaty provisions on free movement of persons only apply in an 
inter-State context. A direct result is the emergence of reverse discrimination: persons 
who remain confined within their Member State of origin cannot benefit from the 
more generous rights accorded to their ‘migrant’ compatriots and to nationals from 
other Member States. Based upon an analysis of the recent case law of the ECJ, it is 
contended that the requirement of a “cross-border element” to bring a situation in the 
ambit of EC law has been interpreted in an increasingly flexible manner. It is argued 
that this approach, which seems to be inspired by a desire to avoid reverse 
discrimination as much as possible, leads to legal uncertainty. In addition, the ECJ’s 
case law on purely internal situations appears to disregard the trend towards regional 
devolution in many Member States. This approach entails the risk that new barriers to 
free movement of persons may be introduced within rather than between the EU 
Member States. The combination of both observations leads to the conclusion that the 
distinction between cross-border situations and purely internal situations becomes 
increasingly blurred. Two alternative options for clarifying the boundaries between 
the application of EC law and national law are discussed: (i) a flexible interpretation 
of the Treaty provisions on European citizenship and (ii) an adaptation of the current 
case law to the constitutional realities of the EU Member States. This final option is 
regarded as the most appropriate solution to ensure a better balance between the right 
to free movement of persons under EC law and the competence of EU Member States 
to regulate purely internal situations in line with the principles of conferred powers 
and subsidiarity (Art. 5 EC Treaty).    
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Free movement of persons and  
 ‘purely internal situations’:  
in search of a new balance 
1 Introduction 
The EC Treaty provisions on free movement of persons do not apply to situations 
where all facts are confined within one Member State.1 Such situations have no 
connection with European Community (EC) law and are to be dealt with in the 
framework of the national legal system of the Member State concerned. This 
distinction between the scope of application of EC law and national law is based upon 
the division of competences in a multilevel constitutional structure and reflects the 
principles of conferred powers and subsidiarity (Art. 5 EC). In practice, however, the 
dividing line between “cross-border situations” and “purely internal situations” is not 
always straightforward. Moreover, the interaction between the EC and the Member 
States’ legal order potentially leads to reserve discrimination, i.e. the less favourable 
treatment of some of a Member State’s own nationals in comparison to nationals of 
other Member States.2  In other words, reverse discrimination occurs when a Member 
State does not extend to its own nationals the same treatment it is required by EC law 
to award to nationals of other Member States.3
 
  
It is somewhat paradoxical that Member States remain entitled to discriminate against 
their own nationals in a Community that is based on the rule of law and the principle 
of equal treatment, particularly in the light of the provisions on European citizenship. 
Based upon an analysis of the relevant treaty provisions and the case law of the ECJ, 
this paper analyses how the Court has tried to cope with this situation. First, it is 
contended that the Court’s increasingly flexible interpretation of the “cross-border” 
requirement leads to legal uncertainty. Secondly, the recent Flemish care insurance 
case before the Belgian Constitutional Court is used to illustrate the limits of the 
preliminary procedure as an instrument to prevent reverse discrimination at the 
national level. Proceeding from the identified problems and inconsistencies of the 
                                                 
1 Case 175/78, Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, para. 11; Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson 
and Jhanjan ECR [1982] 3723, para. 16; Case C-153/91 Petit ECR [1992] I-4973, para. 
8. 
2 See also: E. Cannizzaro, “Producing ‘Reverse Discrimination’ Through the Exercise of EC 
Competences”, Yearbook of European Law (1997) p. 29. 
3 M. Poiares Maduro, “The Scope of European Remedies : the Case of Purely Internal 
Situations and Reverse Discrimination”, in: C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz, P. Skidmore (eds), 
The Future of Remedies in Europe, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000,p. 117.  
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Court’s case law, a better balance between the application of EC law and the 
regulatory autonomy of the Member States is suggested.  
2  The requirement of a “cross-border” element  
2.1 An analysis of the EC Treaty provisions  
Pursuant to Article 5 EC Treaty, “the Community shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon it by the Treaty and the objectives assigned to it therein”.4 
Hence, the question whether a cross-border element is required to trigger the 
application of EC law essentially depends on the attributed competences of the EC 
and the specific objectives as laid down in the treaties. Accordingly, it is not the case 
that all so-called “internal situations” are automatically deprived from a link with EC 
law. The principle of equality between men and women (Art. 141 EC), for instance, 
also applies to situations where all elements are confined within a single Member 
State.5 The situation is different as far as the rules of the EC internal market are 
concerned. Article 3 (1) c EC Treaty provides for the establishment of an internal 
market characterised by “the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital”.6 Article 14 (2) of the same 
Treaty further defines the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”.7
The relevant Treaty provisions dealing with the four fundamental freedoms all refer to 
the notion of inter-State movement. Articles 28 and 29 EC Treaty dealing with the 
free movement of goods prohibit quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect “between Member States”. Regarding the free movement of persons, 
Article 43 EC explicitly provides for a right of establishment for nationals of a 
Member State “in the territory of another Member State”. Article 49 EC on free 
movement of services is even more explicit: restrictions are prohibited “in respect of 
nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community other 
  
                                                 
4 Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ (2002) C 
325/33. 
5  See e.g. Case 149/79, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation ariénne 
Sabena [1978] ECR 1365. On the conceptual distinction between “purely internal 
situations” and the existence of a link with EC law, see also the Opinion of Advocate 
General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and  
Walloon Government v. Flemish Government [2008] ECR 1683, para. 136.   
6 Emphasis added. 
7 Emphasis added.  
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than that of the person for whom the services are intended”. Finally, the EC Treaty 
provisions on capital movements (Art. 43 and 90 EC) also presuppose transnational 
actions. Similar references to cross-border elements can be found in secondary 
legislation such as Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes 
to employed persons and their family moving within the Community,8 or the services 
Directive.9
In contrast to the clear transnational orientation of the four economic freedoms, 
aiming at the abolishment of barriers between Member States, the Treaty provisions 
on European citizenship do not include similar references. Article 17 EC states that 
“every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union”. Article 18 EC further provides that “every citizen of the Union shall have the 
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to 
give it effect”. It could, therefore, be argued that Article 18 EC includes a general 
right of residence without a requirement of prior movement between Member 
States.
  
10 From this perspective, the fundamental status of EU citizen would be 
regarded as a sufficient linking factor with Community law irrespective the existence 
of a cross-border element. Such interpretation, however, would discard the scope of 
application of Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.11 
Article 3 (1) of the latter Directive restricts the scope of application to “all Union 
citizens who move or reside in a Member State or than that of which they are a 
national”. Moreover, it would be inconsistent with the case law of the ECJ, which 
continues to regard the requirement of a cross-border element as a precondition for 
the application of the EC law provisions on free movement of persons.12
2.2 The European Court of Justice and the “purely internal rule”  
  
In the Saunders case of 1979 the ECJ was confronted with the question whether a 
British national working in Northern Ireland could rely on Article 48 EEC-Treaty 
                                                 
8 OJ (1971) L 149/2. In a judgment of 22 September 1992, the ECJ explicitly confirmed that 
this Regulation does not apply to situations which are confined in all respects in a single 
Member State. ECJ, Case C-153/91, Camille Petit v. Office nationale des personnes ECR 
[1992] I-4973, at para. 10. 
9 Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ (2006) L 
376/36.  
10 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op.cit., para. 144. 
11 OJ (2004) L 158/77.  
12 See: Case C-212/06, op. cit.; Case C-127/08, Metock and others, judgment of 25 July 2008, 
n.y.r., para. 77. 
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(Art. 39 EC) against a penal measure restricting the applicant’s right to move freely to 
England and Wales. The Court acknowledged that the rights conferred upon workers 
by the E(E)C Treaty may lead the Member States to amend their legislation even with 
respect to their own nationals but also explicitly excluded purely internal situations 
from the scope of application of EC law:  
“The provisions of the Treaty on free movement of workers cannot be applied 
to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words, 
where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by 
Community law”.13
This first expression of what became known as “the purely internal rule” is based 
upon a combination of arguments. First, the absence of jurisdiction for the ECJ to deal 
with purely internal situations is based upon the regulatory autonomy of the Member 
States, which is a key notion of the EU constitutional legal order.
  
14 Second, all EC 
Treaty provisions related to the internal market include an explicit or implicit 
requirement of a cross-border element (cf. supra). Accordingly, the objective of the 
internal market as an “area without internal frontiers” is understood to be the 
abolishment of all inter-State frontiers to free movement to the exclusion of so-called 
intra-State frontiers (i.e. inside Member States)15 and external frontiers (i.e. between 
Member States and non-Member countries).16
In the light of the objective to create an internal market, the aim of the free movement 
of persons provisions is to ensure that production factors can move freely between 
Member States. Hence, only situations where the application of a national measure 
might deter a Member State national from exercising an (economic) activity in an 
inter-State context is covered by EC law. This interpretation was clearly expressed in 
the case of Mr. Knoors, a Dutch national who worked as a plumber in Belgium but 
  
                                                 
13 Case 175/78, Saunders [1979] ECR 1129, para. 11.  
14 Article 5 EC Treaty.  
15 Significantly, the ECJ case law on customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect 
provides an important exception to this interpretation. This line of case-law is based upon 
practical and conceptual considerations. On the practical side, the Court pointed at the 
difficulties to distinguish between products from domestic origin and those from other 
Member States. From a more conceptual point of view, the application of EC law to 
internal border tariffs stems from the very principle of a customs union. See ECJ 16 July 
1992, Case C-163/90, Legros e.a., ECR I-4625, paras. 16-17; ECJ 9 Aug. 1994, Joined 
Cases C-363 and 407 to 411/93, Lancry e.a., ECR I-3957, paras. 27-29; ECJ 14 Sept. 
1995, Joined Cases C-485 et 486/93, Simitzi, ECR I-2655, para. 17; ECJ, Case C-72/03, 
Carbonati Apuani, ECR I-8027, para. 22.  
16 Opinion of Advocate General Léger in case C-293/02, Jersey Produce Marketing 
Organisation Ltd v. Jersey ECR [2006] I-9543, at para. 134. 
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was refused to carry out the same work in his country of origin because he did not 
possess the necessary qualifications under the Dutch legislation. Despite attempts 
from the part of the Dutch authorities to invoke the purely internal rule, the ECJ 
acknowledged that a person who returns to his or her Member State of origin after 
working a period in another Member State satisfies the cross-border requirement to 
benefit from the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty. Any other solution 
could discourage a Member States’ nationals to effectively benefit from opportunities 
of free movement under Community law.17 This logic implies that persons who 
obtained a diploma or a vocational qualification in another Member State and return 
to their Member State of origin fall within the scope of EC law.18
 
  
The Court’s reasoning to assimilate a Member States’ own nationals who made use of 
their right to freedom of (inter-State) movement with that of other Member State 
nationals  is obviously inspired by the effet utile of the free movement provisions. On 
several occasions, the ECJ proclaimed that:     
 
“All of the Treaty provisions relating to the freedom of movement for persons 
are intended to facilitate the pursuit by Community nationals of occupational 
activities of all kinds throughout the Community, and preclude measures 
which might place Community nationals at a disadvantage when they wish to 
pursue an economic activity in the territory of another Member State”.19
 
  
In the case of Moser, the Court established the limits of this approach. By reasons of 
his membership of the German communist party, the authorities of the Land Baden-
Wurttemberg refused to allow Hans Moser, a German national, to undertake the post-
graduate training necessary to work as a teacher at primary and secondary school 
level. Mr Moser claimed that this refusal precluded him from applying for posts in 
schools in other Member States and, as such, infringed his right to free movement of 
workers under EC law. The ECJ, however, did not accept this argumentation:  
 
“A purely hypothetical prospect of employment in another Member State does 
not establish a sufficient connection with Community law” 20
                                                 
17 Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatsecretaris van Economische Zaken [1979] ECR 399, para. 20. 
 
18 Case C-61/89, Bouchoucha [1990] ECR, I-3551; Case C-19/92, Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663; 
Case C-234/97, Fernandez de Bombadilla [1999] ECR I-4773.  
19 Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, para. 16; Case C-18/95 Terhoeve [1999] ECR I-
345, para. 37; Case C-190/98 Graf [2000] ECR I-493, para. 21; Case C-302/98 Sehrer 
[2000] ECR I-4585, para. 32 and Case C-209/01, Schilling and Fleck-Schilling [2003] 
ECR I-13389, para. 24. 
20 Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Bad Württemberg, [1984] 2539, para. 18.  
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Significantly, until the entry into force of the Council directives on residence and the 
Treaty provisions on citizenship, EC law covered freedom of movement for persons 
only from an economic perspective.21 Without expressly invoking the purely internal 
rule, the ECJ found in Werner that residence in another Member State did not in its 
own constitute a sufficient foreign element to engage the Treaty rules on freedom of 
establishment.22 In Ritter-Coulais, however, the Court silently reversed its previous 
case law when it considered that Article 39 EC could be invoked by a German couple 
employed in Germany but resident in France for the purpose of determining the rate 
of taxation applicable to their income in Germany.23
The growing irrelevance of the reasons for inter-State movement was further 
confirmed in Hartmann. In this case, a German national transferred his permanent 
residence to Austria while continuing to work in Germany. The fact that Mr. 
Hartmann settled in Austria for reasons not connected with his employment did not 
affect his status as a migrant worker in the opinion of the Court.
 According to this ‘new’ 
approach, the Court no longer examines the economic purpose of an inter-State 
movement but rather accepts that a cross-border element in itself is sufficient to bring 
a situation under the EC internal market rules.   
24 This conclusion 
contradicted the Opinion of Advocate Geelhoed who claimed that such a solution 
undermines the Community system of free movement of persons between the 
Member States as laid down in the EC Treaty.25
                                                 
21 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-112/91, Hans Werner v. Finanzambt 
Aachen-Innestadt [1993] I-429, para. 30-32.  
 Pursuant to the Advocate General, 
this system is based upon a distinction between four categories of free movement 
depending upon the reasons for which a Community national wishes to move to 
another Member State. Separate legal regimes are established for movement related to 
employment, establishment, the provision of services and – since the entry into force 
of the Maastricht Treaty – also for movement and residence related to non-economic 
activities. In order to determine which regime is applicable to a given situation – in 
other words, to identify the relevant Treaty provision – it is necessary to establish the 
reasons underlying the inter-State movement. The consequence of the approach 
followed by the Court in cases such as Ritter-Coulais and Hartmann is that the 
distinction between the various Treaty provisions, in particular between free 
22 This case concerned a German dentist who had acquired all his professional qualifications 
in Germany, had practised his profession only in Germany and was subject to German tax 
legislation but was resident in the Netherlands.  
23 Case C-152/03, Ritter-Coulais [2006] ECR I-1711. See also: D. Martin, “A silent reversal 
of Werner?”, 8 European Journal of Migration and Law (2006), pp. 231-237. 
24 Case C-212/05, Gertraud Hartmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2007] I-6203, para. 18. 
25 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-212/05, op.cit., para. 32. 
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movement of workers and the freedom to move on the basis of European citizenship, 
has become increasingly blurred.26
Whereas with the introduction of the citizenship provisions the traditional requirement 
of an economic activity is no longer determinant in order to bring a situation within 
the ambit of EC law,
  
27 the purely internal rule continues to apply. When two third 
country nationals, married to German nationals who had always lived and worked in 
Germany, sought to rely on EC law to obtain employment rights, the Court first 
recalled the classical rule that Community legislation regarding freedom of movement 
of workers cannot be applied to the situation of workers – and their family members – 
who have never exercised their right to free movement within the Community.28
“Citizenship of the Union, established by Article 8 of the EC Treaty [Article 17 
EC], is not intended to extend the scope rationae materiae of the Treaty also 
to internal situations which have no link with Community law”.
 On 
the specific question whether the new status of citizenship affects this principle, the 
Court bluntly observed that:  
29
The only justification for this conclusion was found in Article 47 EU (ex Article M), 
which provides that nothing in the EU Treaty is to affect the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities or the subsequent Treaties or Acts amending them. The Court 
derived from this principle that the purely internal rule applicable in respect of 
freedom of movement for persons cannot be affected by the new articles on 
citizenship, which have been inserted by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union. This interpretation appears somewhat strange, if not completely wrong. As 
observed by Advocate General Sharpston in the Flemish care insurance case, a 
different and more plausible reading of Article 47 EU is that its primary purpose is to 
protect the acquis communautaire against any encroachment by acts based on the 
second or third pillar of the Union.
   
30
                                                 
26 Ibid., para. 38. 
 Hence, the Advocate General hinted at a 
potential reversal of the traditional doctrine on purely internal situations. Based upon 
the observation that citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of 
27 Case C-85/96, Maria Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern [1998] I-2691. 
28 Joint cases C-64/96 and C-65/96, Kari Uecker and Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein 
Westfalen [1997] I-3171, para. 17 
29 Ibid., para. 23. 
30 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op.cit., para. 138. See in this 
respect also Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council ECR [2008] I-3651. 
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the Member States,31
The ECJ did not accept the revolutionary approach suggested by the Advocate 
General but reconfirmed its settled case law that the Treaty rules governing freedom 
of persons, including the principle of citizenship of the Union as laid down in Articles 
17 and 18 EC, cannot be applied to purely internal situations. As a result, a distinction 
between two categories of persons had to be made in order to clarify whether the 
exclusion from the Flemish care insurance scheme of Belgian nationals working in 
Flanders or Brussels but residing in Wallonia was in accordance with EC law. First, 
with regard to Belgian citizens who have made use of their Community rights to 
freedom of movement the solution is relatively easy. Their situation is to be 
assimilated with that of citizens of other Member States which implies that they can 
benefit from the protection offered by EC law. The broad interpretation of the 
freedom of movement provisions – prohibiting any national measure which, even 
though applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, is capable of 
hindering or rendering less attractive the exercise of free movement
 the requirement of a cross-border element for the application of 
the citizenship provisions appears superficial.  
32  - as well as the 
fact that the constitutional organisation of a Member State cannot justify an 
infringement of those treaty provisions33, led to the conclusion that the Flemish care 
insurance legislation infringed the free movement provisions as far as this category of 
persons is concerned. With regard to Belgian citizens who have not made use of their 
freedom of movement rights, however, Community law is not applicable. Hence, the 
situation of those category of persons is exclusively dealt with in the framework of the 
national legal system. Despite the remark of the ECJ that “interpretation of provisions 
of Community law might possibly be of use to the national court, having regard too to 
situations classed as purely internal”,34
                                                 
31 Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR. I-6193, para 31; Case C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR 
I-5763, para. 16; Case C-520/04, Turpeinen [2006] I-10685, para. 18. 
 the Belgian Constitutional Court excluded an 
extension of the Flemish care insurance to ‘static’ Belgians residing outside Flanders 
32 Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] ECR I-1663, para. 32; Case C-285/01 Burbaud [2003] ECR 
I-8219, para. 95 and Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France [2004] ECR I-8961, para. 11.   
33 The central argument of the Flemish government for justifying the restrictions on the free 
movement of persons provisions concerned the internal division of competences within 
the Belgian federal state structure, namely the fact that the Flemish Community is not 
competent under Belgian constitutional law to extend its legislation on care insurance in 
respect to persons residing in the territory of other linguistic communities of the country. 
The ECJ, however, did not accept such argument on the basis of its established case law 
that “a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in its 
domestic legal order, including those resulting from the constitutional organization of that 
State, to justify the failure to observe obligations arising under Community law”. Case C-
212/06, op. cit. at para. 57-58. 
34 Ibid., para. 40. [emphasis added] 
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or Brussels.35 This might be surprising to an outsider – particularly in the light of the 
wording of Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution36 – but is logical from the 
perspective of the division of powers between the autonomous entities in the Belgian 
federal structure.37
The combination of the application of national law and the application of EC law, 
which forces the Belgian Constitutional Court to introduce an exception to the rule of 
mutually exclusive territorial competences for the federated entities insofar as it 
concerns nationals of other Member States or Belgians who previously made use of 
their right to freedom of movement within the EC, produces a situation of reverse 
discrimination. Depending upon the fact whether a Belgian national working in 
Flanders or Brussels but residing in Wallonia can prove a link with EC law, he or she 
will be able to benefit or not from the Flemish care insurance scheme. In other words, 
the distinction between a cross-border situation and a purely internal situation is of 
fundamental importance to define the rights of the persons concerned. This criterion 
raises practical and legal problems. It is, for instance, not entirely clear what kind of 
movement should be exercised, when that exercise should have happened and for how 
long a cross-border element should exist.
  
38
The issue of reverse discrimination is an old sore in the process of European 
integration. The gradual expansion of EC competences and the creation of European 
citizenship has only reinforced the feeling that situations of reverse discrimination are 
hardly acceptable under EC law.
   
39
                                                 
35 Cour const., 11/2009, 21 January 2009.    
 The unequal treatment of Union citizens, based 
36 Articles 10 and 11 of the Belgian Constitution provide that “all Belgians are equal before 
the law” and that “enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised for Belgians should 
be ensured without discrimination”.  
37 The difference of treatment on matters where the federated entities have been attributed 
exclusive territorial competences is not considered to be a form of discrimination under 
Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution but rather a logical consequence of regional 
autonomy. Cour const., 11/2009, 21 January 2009, B. 16. 
38 D. Martin, ‘Comments on Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement 
wallon (Case C-212/06 of 1 April 2008) and Eind (Case C-291/05 of 11 December 
2007)’, 10 E.J.M.L. (2008) p. 372.  
39 E. Spaventa, “Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and 
Its Constitutional Effects”, 45 C.M.L.Rev. (2008) pp. 13-45; A. Iliopoulou, Libre 
circulation et non-discrimination, éléments du statut de citoyen de l’Union européenne 
(Brussels, Bruylant 2008) pp. 267-317; R. White, “Free Movement, Equal Treatment and 
Citizenship of the Union”, 4 ICLQ (2005) pp. 885-905; N. Shuibhne, “Free Movement of 
Persons and Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?”, 39 C.M.L.Rev. (2002) pp. 731-
771; S. O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship. From the Free 
Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1996) 
pp. 273-278.  
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upon what is perceived as an “arbitrary distinction”40 between cross-border and purely 
internal situations, undermines the legitimacy of the Union.41
3 Coping with reverse discrimination: the response of the 
European Court of Justice 
 The Court seems not 
insensitive to this problem and has tried to tackle this challenge by softening its 
interpretation of the cross-border requirement (3.1.), on the one hand, and guiding the 
Member States through the preliminary procedure, on the other hand (3.2). Both 
solutions, however, fail to solve the problems and inconsistencies surrounding the 
issue of reverse discrimination.  
3.1 An increasingly generous interpretation of the “cross-border” element  
The ECJ’s case law on the distinction between cross-border and purely internal 
situations is  inspired by a motivation to protect the freedom of inter-State movement. 
In Singh, for instance, it was clearly established that the rights given to a Community 
national and his family members upon return to his Member State of origin are 
deemed necessary to guarantee the original free movement to another Member State. 
A national could be deterred from leaving his country of origin if the conditions of 
entry and residence were not at least equivalent to those granted by Community law in 
the territory of another Member State.42
“Nationals are deterred from moving to another Member State in two cases: if 
upon their return their position is worse off if they had remained; or if they 
were prevented from enjoying any goods or qualification obtained during their 
stay in the other Member State. That was not the case in Singh.”
 Hence, it is essentially the initial movement 
to another Member State which is protected. In the concrete situation of Mr. Singh, 
the spouse of a British national who returned to the United Kingdom after working in 
Germany, the value of this argument is questionable. In fact, as observed by Poaires 
Maduro:  
43
Whereas in Knoors, for instance, the link with the effective functioning of the internal 
market was straightforward (cf. supra), the Court’s more recent case law seems to 
suggest that also situations having a very tenuous link with this objective are brought 
 
                                                 
40 D. Pickup, “Reverse Discrimination and Freedom of Movement for workers”, 23 CMLRev. 
(1986) p. 154. 
41 C. Dautricourt and S. Thomas, “Reverse discrimination and free movement of persons 
under Community law: All for Ulysses, nothing for Penelope?” 34 E.L.Rev. (2009) p. 
436. 
42 Case C-370/90, Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, para. 19-20. 
43 M. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. footnote 3, p. 125. 
 12 
within the scope of application of EC law, arguably in an attempt to prevent reverse 
discrimination as much as possible. 44 The requirement of a cross-border element is 
already considered to be fulfilled in the absence of physical movement45 and in 
situations where the link with the internal market seems to be far-fetched. A typical 
example is that of Carpenter where the Court accepted that the occasional provision 
of advertising services of a British national, living and working in the United 
Kingdom, was sufficient to trigger the application of the EC Treaty provisions 
relating to the freedom to provide services, leading to the recognition of a residence 
right for his wife, a national of the Philippines.46
“It is clear that the separation of Mr and Mrs Carpenter would be detrimental 
to their family life and, therefore, to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter 
exercises a fundamental freedom. That freedom could not be fully effective if 
Mr Carpenter were to be deterred from exercising it by obstacles raised in his 
country of origin to the entry and residence of his spouse”.
 It is noteworthy, that also in this 
case, the ECJ upholds its classical argumentation related to the effet utile of the 
fundamental freedoms:  
47
It is, however, highly questionable whether his rights as a provider of services abroad 
would be deterred by the refusal to grant a residence right to his wife in the host State. 
This very generous interpretation of the free movement provisions raises questions 
about the residual competences of the Member States.
 
48 Moreover, it reinforces the 
perception that the purely internal rule and its implications of (potential) reverse 
discrimination are fundamentally unfair.49
 
  
Despite the fact that the Court’s case law on free movement rights significantly 
extends the number of Member State nationals benefitting from  EC treaty protection, 
it is not able to exclude situations of reverse discrimination in practice. With regard to 
the remaining category of persons who are unable to demonstrate a cross-border 
element to be assimilated with other Community nationals, the Court has attempted to 
guide the national courts in preventing reverse discrimination in the framework of the 
preliminary procedure.   
                                                 
44 A. Tryfonidou, ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in A 
Citizens’ Europe’, 35 LIEI (2008), p. 43.  
45 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 20-22 ; Case C-200/02, 
Zhu et Chen, [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECR I-11613. 
46 Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002] ECR  I-6279, para. 30.  
47 Ibid., para. 39. 
48 “Freedoms unlimited? Reflections on Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State”, Editorial 
comments, 40 CMLRev. (2003) 537.  
49 C. Dautricourt and S. Thomas, op. cit. note 41 p. 446. 
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3.2 Guiding the Member States through the preliminary procedure 
Instead of refusing an answer to preliminary questions related to purely internal 
situations, the ECJ has adopted the approach that a request for a preliminary ruling 
“may be rejected only if it is quite obvious that the interpretation of Community law 
sought by that court bears no relation to the actual nature of the case or the subject-
matter of the main action”.50 Such a situation is quite exceptional because in Guimont, 
the Court accepted that the interpretation of Community law might be interesting even 
in circumstances where all the facts at issue are confined within one Member State.51 
This principle, applied for the first time in the context of the free movement of goods, 
was later extended to the other fundamental freedoms.52
 
  
As contended by Advocate General Geelhoed in Reisch, the purpose of this approach 
is to provide the national courts with the necessary information to determine whether 
the case at stake involves reverse discrimination.53 Obviously, the underlying idea is 
that a general right of equality under national constitutional law could almost 
automatically lead to a treatment of purely internal situations comparable to that of 
situations falling within the scope of EC law.54 Such a solution appeared to work for 
example in Italy55 but faced its limits in the Flemish care insurance case (cf. supra). 
The different perceptions of the ECJ and the Belgian Constitutional Court on at least 
three fundamental issues (social security, free movement of persons and the 
constitutional autonomy of regional entities) explain the final result of reverse 
discrimination.56
 
  
The existence of reverse discrimination in Member States with a decentralised 
constitutional structure creates specific legal problems. As observed by Advocate 
General Sharpston, there is a risk that decentralised authorities of Member States 
                                                 
50 Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR I-4139, para. 22.  
51 Case C-448/98, Guimont [2000] ECR I-10663, para. 21-24. 
52 Regarding free movement of capital: Joined cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-
526/99 to C-540/99, Hans Reisch and others [2002] I-2157, para. 26; regarding free 
movement of services: Case C-6/01, Anomar [2003] I-8621, para. 41; regarding free 
movement of workers, C-212/06, op. cit.   
53 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Joint cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and 
C-526/99 to C-540/99, op. cit., para. 87. 
54 E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union. Barriers to Movement in 
their Constitutional Context , Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007, p. 
128. 
55 See: Corte costituzionale, sentenza 16-30 dicembre 1997, n. 443. 
56 See: P. Van Elsuwege and S. Adam, “The Limits of Constitutional Dialogue for the 
Prevention of Reverse Discrimination”, 5 ECLRev. (2009) pp. 334-337.  
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endowed with autonomous regulatory powers will reintroduce barriers to free 
movement within Member States whereas the ECJ’s case law only deals with 
obstacles to movement between Member States.57
4 Towards a new balance between the application of EC law and 
the regulatory autonomy of the Member States 
 The existing solutions based upon a 
broad interpretation of the free movement provisions and the constitutional dialogue 
organised in the context of the preliminary procedure are inadequate to tackle this 
challenge. Hence, a reinterpretation of the purely internal rule taking into account the 
constitutional developments towards regional devolution in several Member States 
seems recommendable. At least two possible options can be distinguished. First, a 
flexible interpretation of the Treaty provisions on European citizenship might be 
suggested (4.1.). Second, a more functional approach to the purely internal rule, 
inspired by the case law on state aid, is developed (4.2.). 
4.1. A broad interpretation of the Treaty provisions on European citizenship: 
a de facto abolition of the cross-border requirement 
On several occasions its has been argued that the purely internal rule – and, in 
particular, the corollary of reverse discrimination –  is “an incongruity in a citizens’ 
Europe”58, which is difficult to reconcile with the logic of the internal market and the 
evolution of the European integration process.59 Helen Toner, for instance, stated that 
“if citizenship is to have a real meaning, in particular by creating a direct link between 
the Union and the citizens, then it may become increasingly unacceptable to say that 
the majority of citizens who do not make use of their rights under the Treaty to live 
and work in other Member States that Community law has no application to their 
situation”.60
 
  
As indicated before, Advocate General Sharpston appeared not insensitive for this line 
of reasoning in her Opinion in the Flemish care insurance case. By pointing at the 
“arbitrariness of attaching so much importance to crossing a national border”, she 
suggested that citizenship in itself could be a sufficient connecting factor to EC law 
                                                 
57 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op. cit., para. 118. 
58 A. Tryfonidou, ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An Incongruity in A 
Citizens’ Europe’, 35 LIEI (2008), pp. 43-67. 
59 See legal doctrine mentioned in note 39. 
60 H.Toner, “Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship – Transformation or 
Consolidation”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2000) p. 170. 
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irrespective the existence of an a priori movement between the Member States.61  
Remarkably, the Advocate General also provides a number of relevant counter-
arguments for such a broad interpretation of the Treaty provisions on citizenship. One 
of the most powerful arguments is certainly related to the division of competences 
between the EU and the Member States.62 A far-reaching extension of the EU 
citizenship provisions, as proposed by Advocate General Sharpston, would 
significantly affect the regulatory autonomy of the Member States, which is protected 
by Article 5 EC. Taking into account the fundamental importance of this issue as a 
cornerstone of the EU constitutional order, extending the territorial scope of the 
Treaty to purely internal situations should not be pushed through without the 
involvement of the Member States.63 In this respect, a prior amendment of Directive 
2004/38, which in contrast to Articles 17 and 18 EC includes an explicit cross-border 
requirement (cf. supra) appears necessary.64
 
  
Finally, the consequences of an abolition of the purely internal rule cannot be 
underestimated. It could lead to an exponential increase of cases before the European 
Courts where all national measures, also those implying purely internal situations, 
would be challengeable for their compatibility with the narrow list of justifications 
laid down in the Treaty and the mandatory requirements recognized by the Court. It is 
questionable whether this trend, which would make the European judges rather than 
the national authorities and elected parliaments the final arbiter of all policy choices 
in the EU Member States, is a desirable development.65
4.2. A functional approach to the “cross-border element”: defining the 
“relevant regulatory authority” 
 Hence, a de facto abolition of 
the cross-border requirement through a broad interpretation of the EC Treaty 
provisions on European citizenship might, at least at this stage of European 
integration, be too ambitious.  
Whereas the regulatory autonomy of EU Member States implies that the decision 
whether or not reverse discrimination is acceptable has to be taken at the national 
                                                 
61 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op.cit., para. 141-144.  
62 Ibid., para. 156. 
63 Significantly, Advocate General Sharpston acknowledges that it is desirable to discuss the 
potential extension of the European citizenship provisions to purely internal situations 
against the background of a fuller participation of the Member States and the European 
Commission. Ibid., para. 156-157. 
64 C. Dautricourt and S. Thomas, op. cit. note 41, p. 450. 
65 C. Ritter, “Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 
234”, 31 ELRev.5 (2006),  p. 701-702. 
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level – where it is also subject to judicial control in light of the national constitutional 
principles on equality and non-discrimination – is defendable, the situation of 
Member States with a decentralized constitutional order remains problematic. 
Decentralised authorities having the relevant regulatory power can adopt legislation 
which is not necessarily detrimental for its own “citizens”, i.e. inhabitants of the 
territory within its competence, but nevertheless leads to reverse discrimination at the 
level of the Member State. Once again, the Flemish care insurance case provides a 
perfect example of such a situation. It is rather paradoxical to observe that if Flanders 
were to be an independent Member State of the Union, the impossibility for persons 
living in Wallonia but working in Flanders to benefit from the Flemish care insurance 
scheme would clearly infringe the EC Treaty rules on free movement.66
 
 Moreover, it 
seems somewhat strange that persons moving between two quasi-autonomous regions 
within a Member State are considered as ‘static’ from the perspective of EC law.  
The ECJ’s traditional interpretation of inter-State movement to distinguish between 
cross-border and purely internal situations insufficiently takes into account the 
regional devolution in several EU Member States. As a result, the effet utile of the 
Community freedom of movement is at risk, since decentralised authorities may 
reintroduce barriers to free movement “through the backdoor”, i.e. within Member 
States.67  In order to avoid such an evolution, a more dynamic interpretation of the 
cross-border requirement can be suggested.68 Rather than proceeding from the formal 
notion of a ‘Member State’, the ‘entity having the relevant regulatory authority’ 
within a given area could be used to identify a cross-border situation.69
 
 This can 
correspond to a Member State in case of unitary states but also to a decentralised 
entity within a federal state.  
Inspiration for the further development of this approach could be found in the ECJ’s 
recent case law on state aid. Confronted with the question of whether tax measures 
adopted by a regional or local authority infringed Article 87 (1) EC, the ECJ 
concluded that:  
 
‘[T]he reference framework need not necessarily be defined within the limits of 
the Member State concerned. […] It is possible that an infra-State body enjoys 
                                                 
66 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op. cit., para. 120. 
67 Ibid., para. 116. 
68 See also: P. Van Elsuwege and S. Adam, “Situations purement internes, discriminations à 
rebours et collectivités autonomes après l’arrêt sur l’assurance soins flamande”, 5-6 CDE 
(2008), pp. 704-709.   
69 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-212/06, op. cit., para. 117.  
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a legal and factual status which makes it sufficiently autonomous in relation to 
the central government of a Member State, with the result that, by the 
measures it adopts, it is that body and not the central government which plays 
a fundamental role in the definition of the political and economic environment 
in which undertakings operate. In such a case it is the area in which the infra-
State body responsible for the measure exercises its powers, and not the 
country as a whole, that constitutes the relevant context for the assessment of 
whether a measure adopted by such a body favours certain undertakings in 
comparison with others in a comparable legal and factual situation, having 
regard to the objective pursued by the measure or the legal system 
concerned.’70
 
 
In a judgment of 11 September 2008 the ECJ clarified the conditions under which an 
infra-State body can be regarded as ‘sufficiently autonomous’ to be considered the 
relevant legal framework for the definition of the political and economic environment 
in which undertakings operate.71 First, a decentralised authority must have, from a 
constitutional point of view, a political and administrative status separate from that of 
the central government (institutional autonomy). Second, this authority must have the 
competence to adopt decisions without the central government being able to intervene 
directly as regards their content (procedural autonomy).72
5. Conclusions 
 Third, the consequences of 
those decisions may not be compensated by actions from other regional entities or the 
central government (economic and financial autonomy). Arguably, comparable 
criteria could be applied for the definition of purely internal situations in the 
framework of the EC Internal Market rules. This would not only ensure a better 
recognition of the constitutional realities of the Member States but also prevent 
reverse discrimination without undermining the principles of attributed powers and 
subsidiarity (Art. 5 EC).  
Defining the limits of the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for persons 
is an increasingly complicated task. In the early years of the European integration 
process, only movement from one Member State to another for the purpose of an 
                                                 
70 ECJ 6 Sept. 2006, Case C-88/03, Portugal v. Commission, ECR I-7115, paras. 57-58. 
71 ECJ 11 Sept. 2008, Joined Cases C-428/06 to 434/06, Union General de Trabajos de la 
Rioja, n.y.r., para. 51.  
72 Significantly, in a recent case on tax reform in Gibraltar, the United Kingdom’s residual 
power to legislate was deemed irrelevant in practice to undermine the procedural 
autonomy of the Government of Gibraltar in tax matters. See: CFI 18 Dec. 2008, Joined 
Cases T-211 to 215/04, Gibraltar v. Commission, n.y.r., paras. 89-100. 
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economic activity in the context of the EC internal market was subject to judicial 
scrutiny by the ECJ. Other situations were to be dealt with at the national level. The 
introduction of the status of European citizenship with the Maastricht Treaty has 
significantly extended the personal and material scope of the Treaty to non-economic 
activities without, however, affecting the prerequisite of a cross-border element.  
The growing irrelevance of the reasons for inter-State movement has opened the gates 
for a number of cases where the link with EC law is considered to be tenuous or 
artificial. The result is that the distinction between cross-border and purely internal 
situations falling outside the scope of EC law has become increasingly blurred. This 
observation is particularly problematic when the advantages offered to persons 
benefitting from EC law are not extended to a Member State’s own nationals. Such 
situations of reverse discrimination are not prohibited by EC law due to the principle 
of regulatory autonomy of the Member States laid down in Article 5 EC but sits 
somewhat uncomfortably in light of the principle of equal treatment in a Community 
based on the rule of law.  
The ECJ has tried to prevent situations of reverse discrimination as much as possible 
by offering an interpretation of the provisions of Community law in the framework of 
the preliminary procedure also with regard to situations classed as purely internal. 
Such an approach appears successful only when the law of the Member State 
concerned requires every national of that State to be allowed to enjoy the same rights 
as those which a national of another Member State would derive from EC law in a 
comparable situation. This solution does not seem to work in Member States with a 
decentralised constitutional structure. The settled case law of the ECJ that a State’s 
constitutional structure cannot justify a limitation of free movement rights in 
combination with the State-centric interpretation of the cross-border requirement, 
implies that the Court is ill-equipped to tackle barriers to free movement inside 
Member States, introduced by autonomous regional entities.  
In order to respond to the new challenges resulting from the trend towards regional 
devolution in many Member States, two possible solutions can be contemplated. The 
first, based on a broad interpretation of the Treaty provisions on European citizenship 
is legally sound but raises important practical problems. Therefore, a less far-reaching 
solution based upon the identification of the “relevant regulatory authority” in a given 
territory is suggested. It is argued that this option provides a better balance between 
the Community right to free movement of persons, on the one hand, and the 
constitutional autonomy of the Member States to regulate purely internal situations, 
on the other hand.    
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